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Project on Ethnic Relations PER Logo

June 17-18, 1991

The symposium, conducted jointly with the Romanian Academy, was the first ina series of efforts under the Project on Ethnic Relations in Eastern Europesponsored by the Carnegie Corporation of New York and organized at theInternational Research Exchanges Board (IREX). It is part of a long-termeffort that will include the founding of an American-East European Councilon Ethnic Accord and a regional consortium of policy and research institutesconcerned with ethnic issues.

The purpose of the meeting was to encourage open discussion of ethnicissues, not only among scholars, but among individuals from governmental andother institutions. While including a scholarly component, the emphasis ofthe symposium was practical, its aim being to stimulate new and creativethinking about old issues and problems in order to reduce ethnic conflict.

This report was prepared at the request of the Project on Ethnic Relationsby Larry Watts of UCLA/RAND, the University of Washington, Seattle, and theIREX Bucharest Office. It has not been reviewed by the Romanian Academy,which is not responsible for its contents.


After brief opening remarks by Mihai Draganescu, president of the RomanianAcademy, Allen H. Kassof, IREX Executive Director, congratulated the Academyon its courage and foresight in holding the first international forum inRomania on the country's ethnic problems. Aside from the universal valuesinvolved, Kassof noted, the American interest in East European ethnicproblems was based on an understanding that the processes of democracy werecomplex and could be imperiled by destructive ethnic conflict. At the sametime, ethnic accord would benefit Europe, and the United States has animportant stake in a peaceful Europe. However, America could only bring tothe symposium a friendly, neutral and sympathetic ear, for it had no answersand continues to seek solutions to its own ethnic problems.

Livia B. Plaks, Associate Director of the Project on Ethnic Relations,sketched IREX's cooperative involvement in Romania and stressed that, afterthe December 1989 revolution, IREX undertook a special commitment to helpreintegrate this country back into Europe and the Western world. Inconnection with the ethnic project, IREX is establishing electronic networksand communications facilities, basic reference libraries on ethnic conflictand its reduction, field research projects, training seminars forspecialists, and, from time to time, conferences such as this.

Unlike the December 1990 conference on ethnic conflict and its reduction inEastern Europe held in New York City, which inaugurated the project, theIREX-Romanian Academy Symposium on Inter-ethnic Relations wascountry-specific. Whereas the earlier conference was composed of 17 Americanspecialists and specialists representing each of the six East Europeancountries, this one had a smaller contingent of Americans-- nineparticipants including four presenters--while the Romanian side was composedof 31 participants including 11 main presenters. Of the 31, 12 were ofRomanian ethnicity and 19 represented 14 of Romania's other ethnic groups.In addition, there were five observer-participants from Bulgaria,Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Yugoslavia (Serbia), and the Republic ofMoldavia.

This change in composition significantly altered the agenda as it wasoriginally conceived by the American side and highlighted many complexitiesconcerning the problem of ethnic relations which had not been aired at theNew York conference. These complexities had not only to do with differencesin perspective between the majority and minority members, but alsofundamentally different interpretations of the nature of the problem and ofthe various measures that should be taken to address it. Agreement on thenature of the primary problem could not be reached among specialists andrepresentatives of the assembled ethnic groups. In fact, it turned out thatthere were several, often very different, views of what constituted "primaryproblems." This realization was at the same time surprising, enlightening,and troubling for many of the American participants and highlighted theneed, already recognized in New York, to strive towards a common vocabularyand level of knowledge based on the latest research in the world community,Among the many things demonstrated by the Bucharest Symposium was that thelack of common concepts regarding the problem of ethnic tensions constitutedone of the greatest obstacles to their reduction.


The lack of a common terminology, and the differences in perceptions held byRomanian and American participants, immediately became apparent indiscussions of the nature and definition of ethnic relations in Romania. Thephraseology used by the American participants was one of ethnic "majoritiesand minorities." Their approach was pragmatic: the need to prevent socialinstability and ethnic violence. Priorities were implicitly assigned to theseveral minorities according to their size; their potential for involvementin serious, especially violent, ethnic conflict; and to their presumedcapacity for formulating, articulating, mobilizing in support of, andachieving their demands vis-a-vis the majority-controlled state. From ahuman rights perspective, all minorities were recognized as equallyimportant. However, from the perspective of contemporary politicalrealities, the problems presented for the state by large minoritypopulations were considered potentially greater and therefore, to requiremore immediate attention. Following this logic, Istvan Deak proposed thatthe conference focus on the problems of the Hungarian, Rom (Gypsy), Jewish,and German ethnic minorities.

This point of view was immediately, and rather sharply, rejected by theparticipants from the Romanian Academy and by many of the ethnic grouprepresentatives for two reasons; the first stemming from the nature of theirapproach, which considered conciliation possible only if based on the equaland similar treatment of all ethnic groups regardless of their size; thesecond resulting from what appeared to some U.S. participants as to behyper-sensitivity concerning national identity and ethnic Romanian(majority) rights.

In the first instance, the terminology of "majority-minority" was consideredby participants as inherently and unnecessarily political, whereas "ethnicgroup" desensitized the issue and better allowed for sober discussion andidentification of common interests. This point of view was shared by Academyresearchers, such as Carmen and Dragos Seuleanu, with researchers ofnon-Romanian ethnicity, such as the Hungarian sociologist Zoltan Rostas, whonoted that political and academic discourse were not compatible.

A second line of criticism leveled against this terminology by the ethnicHungarian, German, Russian and Albanian participants, as well as by membersof the Academy, was that "minority" referred to a quantity rather than aquality. This was interpreted as a reduction in ethnic group status. As PaulPhillipi complained, while the Saxon community had played a very importantpolitical and economic role in Romanian state building in the past, becauseof post-war emigration, the community would now be considered negligiblewere state-centered American criteria to be applied. Other ethnic grouprepresentatives also objected to being characterized as insignificant merelybecause of small numbers. Efforts by some, such as Dinu Giurescu, to explainthat, juridically, all nonethnic Romanians are "minorities", had very littleimpact on the discussion.

Somewhat paradoxically, the use of "minority" was also criticized by manyethnic group participants for the unwanted quality it conveyed, in theirestimation, of marginality and lesser relative merit. Some Romanianparticipants, for example Dan Berendei and Camil Muresan, further criticizedthe use of the term as implying the status of victim, while "majority"implied a guilty oppressor. For these reasons both sides argued for the useof "ethnic group" to denote a relationship of equality--the non-Romanianethnic groups taking this to signify their equal status with Romanians andthe Romanians taking it to affirm their shared innocence or guilt inminority oppression.

In the course of the discussion it became apparent that both "majority" and"minority" had much more a pejorative than neutral, descriptive meaning forethnic Romanians. In the West, there is a generalized understanding of theprivileged position of the majority concerning political and economic accessrelative to the minorities. In the United States, it has even becomestandard practice to consider discrimination as possible only againstminorities by the majority. In consequence, the general proposition thatredressing ethnic discrimination policies requires a change or compromiselargely on the part of the majority is fairly non-controversial. However,this proved not to be the case among the Romanians, who perceived themselvesas one ethnic group in the midst of a struggle for basic rights with otherethnic groups, indicating a level of national insecurity reminiscent of thatwhich existed in 1918.

Three other definitional debates resurfaced throughout the symposium. Thefirst concerned the issue of violence against the Rom or Gypsy population.Romanian government and academic participants consistently characterizedthis as a social conflict, as did Attila Pok, the participant from Hungary,when discussing the same problem in his country. Rom participants,particularly Nicolae Gheorghe, pointed out that the ethnic nature of theviolence alone required that it be treated at least as a problem of bothsocial and ethnic relations.

A second definitional debate was launched when Gail Kligman and KatherineVerdery referred to the violence against the Rom as pogroms, followingstandard Western practice, to describe the driving of a people from alocale. This drew protests from both Romanian and other ethnic groupparticipants because of the value-laden nature of the term in EasternEurope, where it sparks memories of state-directed liquidation of ethnicgroups during World War II. Finally, Kligman and Verdery also drew criticismfrom Romanian participants for advising Romania to acknowledge that it was amulti-ethnic state. The Romanians took this to imply that they were not,despite their appreciable majority, entitled to play the leading role in thestate. Berendei said he had the feeling "that Romanians are being forced toabandon their identity."Rogers Brubaker pointed out the difference that exists between multi-ethnicsocieties and multi-ethnic states, noting that the goal of most centralauthorities in supporting ethnic groups is not necessarily a multi-ethnicstate but rather a less ethnic state . Donald Horowitz explained that theconcept of the nation-state is an obsolete one, having lost both of itsoriginal meanings--the melting pot and the ethnic state. Referring to thework of Walker Connor, Horowitz noted that only one-half of one percent ofthe world's population live in nation/ethnic-states. Therefore the choicesavailable were either consociational states or thousands of separate ethnicstates.


Discussion concerning the demographics of Romania and particularly theRomanian census of 1977 pointed out the shortcomings of the analyzing ofofficial census statistics for ethnic questions.

After describing how the Romanian census was based on the free statements ofrespondents, Vladimir Trebici also noted that there are many reasons forpeople to falsify their answers. Donald Horowitz pointed out that thepolitics of census-taking demanded a healthy skepticism regarding theirdescription of ethnic realities. For example, the current percentage of Romin the population of Romania, according to the 1977 census, is one percent,but the Rom are likely to be underrepresented by as much as a factor of 10,since they received no benefits and were often negatively sanctioned underCeausescu for claiming other than Romanian ethnic origin. Likewise,Romanians are likely to be overrepresented because of the relative benefitsof being considered ethnic Romanian. According to the U.S. pattern, ethnicgroups will gain members if membership confers rewards such as access tomaterial resources and political power.

Responding to these and other criticisms, Trebici pointed out that, althoughthe Romanian census had been overly simplistic, and although the last one in1977 had been an overtly political operation of Ceausescu, no census can bebetter than its methodology. Romania, argued Trebici, employs the standardUnited Nations methodology designed to measure a minimum amount of frankdata given freely--it is not allowed to invade privacy by asking too many ortoo penetrating questions. While the census is based on a minimum number ofresponses freely given, it cannot be a handbook of either anthropology ordemographics since it cannot determine whether or not the responses aretrue. Just as the last U.S. census was criticized for underrepresentingurban minorities, and just as the Netherlands declared its last censusunscientific and renounced the practice of census-taking altogether, so toowill the coming Romanian census in 1992 fall short of criteria which nocensus is capable of meeting.


Perhaps the most problematic issue discussed by participants was that ofcollective or group rights vs. individual rights. A basic division appearedin the debate between the American specialists and Romanian specialistsfamiliar with Western scholarship on ethnic relations on the one side, andother Romanians, including the great majority of non-Romanian ethnicparticipants, on the other.

It emerged that the standard American approach to the management of ethnictensions is to sublimate ethnic identity within a larger state identity andto emphasize individual rights rather than group rights. The generalapproach of the ethnic minority participants at the conference appeared tobe just the opposite: to foster/create an ethnic identity where only a weakidentity existed before, and to gain a recognition of group rights by theRomanian State.

The goals of the ethnic minority participants ranged from the minimum questfor group protection to a maximum of establishing special community rights.For example, as Nicolae Gheorghe explained, for the Rom minority the primaryproblem has been managing ethnic conflict so that it does not becomeviolent. Given the increasing incidence of violence against the Rom inRomania, Slovakia, and throughout Eastern Europe, this appeared to be themost urgent regional problem of ethnic relations outside of Yugoslavia. Onthe other hand, for the Tatar-Turk and Armenian minorities, the crucialproblem was one of gaining access to resources enabling them to printjournals and books in their native tongues and so aid them in fosteringethnic group identification.

Participants from the German and Hungarian minorities stressed the need fora guarantee of group rights. According to Paul Phillipi, the Germans wereoriginally called by the state to be part of the power structure withspecifically defined rights and duties. The model then, the "UniversitatusSaxonus," was the prevalent one before the French Revolution. Now, however,group rights have been replaced with public and private rights, leaving theindividual to confront the state directly--an uneven match at best.

Geza Domokos also stressed the importance of minority group rights. Whilenoting that the predominant Romanian fear is that minority rights will leadto autonomy and then to territorial loss a la the Vienna Diktat of World WarII (in which Romania lost northern Transylvania to Hungary), he nonethelesscriticized the government for agreeing only to individual rights and not togroup rights. Without group rights, Domokos argued, the majority candominate the minority in the name of democracy. Attila Pok added that realequality sometimes demands positive discrimination which is only possible ifcertain collective rights are guaranteed.

According to Kenneth Jowitt, the conflict over collective and individualrights was an artifact of the antagonism existing between the civic, state,and ethnic orientations of the modern nation-state. Ideally, an impersonalsecular state provides for the equal treatment of all. However, thisconflicts with the gemeinschaft identification of ethnic orientations.Moreover, civic and ethnic antagonisms arise because: 1) The civicorientation is individualistic while its ethnic counterpart emphasizes theimportance of the collective or group. 2) The civic orientation isinherently democratic and critical towards authority while the ethnicorientation, by stressing solidarity within the group rather than the rightsof the individual, is inherently more authoritarian. 3) The civicorientation is universalistic and inclusive since it implies a relationshipbetween democratic citizens world-wide, while the ethnic orientation isinherently exclusionist and parochial. The point, Jowitt emphasized, is notthat ethnic is bad but that civic and ethnic orientations are not onlydifferent, but are conflictual as well. At issue, then, is how theseorientations are to be weighted and understood. The central dilemma iswhether the state in new conditions would continue to be defined in oldways--whether state and ethnic definitions would be dominant or, rather,whether they would remain important but secondary. The desired aim is notthe elimination of ethnic identity, but the victory of the civic identity. Acitizen-based Romanian state is a primary condition for political andeconomic democratization.

From a slightly different perspective, Donald Horowitz suggested that thedegree to which a supra-ethnic identification has been created is one way ofplacing Romania on a spectrum from the Third World to the developed West.While Italian-Americans, Japanese-Americans, etc., all consider themselvesAmericans, and German-Swiss and French-Swiss perceive themselves as Swiss,there are no Burmese or Ghanaians. With the rapidly disappearing "Yugoslav"and "Soviet" peoples along its borders, this was a particularly cogent issuefor Romania. Likewise, political parties in the West are not based primarilyon ethnicity, but in Africa and Asia ethnic parties are the norm. Ethnicallybased parties usually impede compromise, Horowitz noted.

The Yugoslav (Serbian) participant, Vojislav Stanovcic, explained that theYugoslav experience after World War II, when the government dropped theconcept of minority rights for individual ones, and added that ofself-determination, led to a series of territorial states in whichindividual rights proved to be insufficient for most ethnic groups whocontinued to push for group rights for the purposes of education, etc.Several of the minority participants, referring to this perceived need,argued that the goal of the state should be unity in diversity. Jowittcountered that, while the notion of unity and diversity presented a niceideal, the typical result was a Tower of Babel, where Hungarians areHungarians, Romanians are Romanians, Rom are Rom, etc. The question arises:what, if anything, will they have in common? The solution, according toJowitt, is neither to make ethnic identity all-important, nor eliminateethnic identity. but to relativize it.

Helena Klimova, of Czechoslovakia, gave a psychoanalytical interpretation ofthe persistence of this adherence to group rights and the supremacy ofethnic identification throughout the region. In an area where peoples aresearching for new meanings and inner orientations, destructive inclinationsare not balanced by functioning constructive forces of school, church,individual ties, family, etc., while the collective self, so long misused bythe former authorities, is now deeply suspect. For better or worse the mostaccessible, ready-made framework providing both meaning and orientation isethnicity. Regardless of the underlying causes for the difference in theethnic and civic orientations, it was clear from the discussion thatmajority and minority Romanians still have difficulty in accepting thelegitimacy of each other's orientations.


In his presentation, Nicolae Gheorghe explained that conflicts betweenpolitical organizations and those between ideological doctrines and policieswere no longer violent due to their basis in rational choice. However, theirrational, bioethnic nature of psychological conflict based on stereotypeslent it an inherently more violent character.

On the same theme, both Kligman and Verdery stressed the importance ofclassification and naming, particularly at such transformational juncturesas Romania, and Eastern Europe in general, are presently facing. Thesejunctures present Romania with both an opportunity and a danger: theopportunity is the chance to create new patterns of ethnic relations bytaking care in the use of names and labels given to members of variousethnic groups so as not to propagate the existing negative stereotypes andpatterns of domination and subordination. The danger, however, is that, withincreased competition for ever scarcer economic resources, and the desire ofcentral authorities to deflect popular criticism, there is, as Verderypointed out, great room for cheap and easy explanations which scapegoatcertain minorities. For example, whereas before the revolution Gypsies wereclassified as "lazy," now, with the scarcity of resources, they areclassified as "busy" with black-marketeering, which is mistakenly blamed forthe lack of available goods.

Jowitt contested the assertion that naming itself, unconnected with a changein social relations, was that important. He argued that the alternation of"nigger, "colored," "Afro-American," "Black," and now, "African-American"had not changed the fundamental reality of racial discrimination in theUnited States.

Similarly, Rogers Brubaker took issue with the assertion by severalparticipants (e.g., Chief Rabbi Moses Rosen of the Romanian Jewish minority,and Helena Klimova) that in many cases political elites created andperpetuated such stereotypes for political advantage and that, if left tolocal populations, the problem would be better managed. While agreeing thatlocal inter-ethnic collaboration was indeed a desired goal, Brubakerquestioned whether it was likely that, if the local communities wereallowed, they would be able to work out their problems alone.

The Bulgarian participant, Ivan Ilchev, added that, in Bulgaria, the mostextreme nationalists are located in the villages and in Turkish settlementsespecially. Therefore ethnic conflict combines with urban-rural andcenter-periphery conflicts when the government intervened in efforts toreduce ethnic tensions. Complicating the situation, Ilchev explained, wasthe unfortunate fact that Bulgarian nationalism was almost entirely based onanti-Turk stereotypes, with all Bulgarian national heroes notable for theiranti-Turkish exploits. Ilchev further noted that research on stereotypes inBulgaria has dwelt exclusively on those of Bulgarians in Bulgaria concerningTurks in Turkey. The Turkish minority in Bulgaria was essentially invisibleboth in textbooks and in research.

On a brighter note, Aleksandra Jasinska of Poland explained that a fewstudies have been made regarding the stereotypes Poles and Russians have ofeach other, particularly in opinion polls and literature. Paul Phillipinoted that several studies on stereotypes in Romania have been undertakenrecently as part of the doctoral research of Romanian students.


Substantial time was spent discussing the past and present role of historyand historians in ethnic relations. The participants were divided on whetherstereotypes could be eliminated, and whether that could be useful.

Nicolae Gheorghe noted that historians have played a tremendous role inhiding the ethnic issue, consistently using history as a political tool. DanBerendei agreed with Gheorghe concerning the extreme nationalism of pasthistorians, but also noted that nationalist historians were important inestablishing a Romanian national identity. More specifically, Moses Rosenemphatically asserted that Romanians must be more aware of their historicresponsibility in the Holocaust so that the reexamination of historycurrently underway does not propagate past ethnic and racial hatreds. In hisview, neither the government nor Romanian historians were taking much actionin this direction.

Geza Domokos expanded on Rosen's theme, explaining that it is a problem ofundesirable historical self-images--a problem exacerbated by 45 years ofCommunist rule and ideologically correct history.

Dinu Giurescu provided a detailed outline of how history had been used toperpetuate ethnic and racial stereotypes and hatreds in Romania, concludingwith several suggestions aimed at remedying the situation. First, historianson both sides of any ethnically sensitive debate, regardless of theirethnicity, need to abandon the confrontational mode and maintain as theirgoal a nuanced and critical approach.

Secondly, historians of different ethnicities need to cooperate in writingtextbooks to allow for an interplay of viewpoints and the expansion ofstudent perceptions. Third, historians need to change their wholeperspective from that of the ethnic community to that of an ethnic partnerin building a civic society.

Paul Phillipi agreed with the essence of Giurescu's suggestions but stressedthat the important question was whether such new efforts would result in a"History of the Romanians" or a "History of Romania".

Istvan Deak was skeptical that a good history could be written through thejoint efforts of two or more naturally divergent points of view. Deak notedthe example of the current political correctness movement in the UnitedStates, that has produced histories in which the contributions of all groupshave been equated resulting in uninformative, flawed, and boring "pap."

The experience of Poland, according to Aleksandra Jasinska, was mixed. Whilethe joint Polish-German commission on World War II was useful, the currentPolish-Soviet joint commission has had very minimal results. Berendei notedthat there still existed a joint Romanian-Hungarian commission which, since1983, has been discussing joint history textbooks and has appointed sixsubcommittees with equal numbers of Hungarian and Romanian historians.

Attila Pok of Hungary explained the old problem as being one in which bothsides took the nation-state as an eternal element in world history insteadof placing it in the real context of chronological development. The moveamong some historians in Hungary now is to deal with broader questions ofman in his environment. According to Pok, recent Romanian-Hungariandiscussions on the medieval period, the 1848 Revolutions, and the 1867Ausgleich, have been helpful and have led to mutual understanding.


The symposium produced a number of specific recommendations for ethnicconflict reduction. Katherine Verdery advised that policy-makers abandon thepractice of discussing policy options in terms of Romanian character. The"are we suited" approach to policy invariably leads to ethnocentric policy.The better approach is to decide in what kind of society Romanians want tolive.

Donald Horowitz suggested that, in redressing ethnic relations imbalances,timing is very important. In general, earlier is better, especiallyregarding dispensations to disadvantaged groups, since later action willface obstruction from politicians and vested interests. With early action,difficult things are made easier, while later action will make even easythings more difficult. Conversely, earlier action will generally be lessefficient than later, but later action usually requires more effort andresources. Finally, devolution of authority, (e.g., federalism, regionalautonomy, etc.,) has proven to be a good idea for conflict reduction inother cases. However, echoing Geza Domokos, Horowitz noted that it is oftenthought by politicians that such devolutions of central authority are thefirst step to secession and are therefore resisted.

Janina Radu, of the Polish ethnic group in Romania, cited the Polishproverb, "what little Johnny does not learn, the grown up Johnny will notknow," to illustrate the need for an educational reform that emphasizes: l )moral values, 2 ) acceptance of otherness, and 3) a new ethic of work welldone. According to Radu, it is up to the educational system to integratecitizens into normal social life but at present, partially for economicreasons, the Romanian educational system is not meeting this need.

Referring specifically to the Hungarian case, Rogers Brubaker inquiredwhether the Hungarian state could be drawn upon for resources such astextbook and teacher issues.

Aleksandra Jasinska, adopting the world system view of Ken Jowitt andHorowitz, stressed that the entire region has been characterized by verticalrelations with each state subordinated to the USSR and an almost totalabsence of horizontal relations with their East European neighbors. Nowthere is a danger of repeating this pattern, with the East Europeancountries turning to the superpowers and competing with oneanother for economic help. To avoid this it was necessary to develop someform of horizontal relations. Jowitt seconded Jasinska, emphasizing thatEastern Europe is in danger of becoming a European ghetto with its outdatedindustries, highest levels of pollution in the world, massive unemployment,and orientation to Western consumption patterns without the resources tosupport them. Regional cooperation is therefore not a utopian ideal, but isa necessity because the United States will not replace the USSR as aregional power. Haim Reimer of the ethnic Jewish minority stressed thatcommon action was imperative: "when your neighbor-s house burns you mustworry because the flames may reach yours."

Academy President Mihai Draganescu thanked the participants, noting thatcertain aspects of the problem would be clarified with the new constitutionand census and reaffirming Jowitt's point that ethnic identity should berelativized to allow for the construction of a civic identity. Allen Kassofthanked the Academy, explaining that this was a useful beginning to a longand complex process but that solutions would have to emanate from withinRomania itself. Ken Jowitt considered it a good omen that Romaniansinitiated this discussion and undertook it in a sober manner. Moreover, itwas valuable to have Romanians and other scholars from Eastern Europediscuss an issue that will directly affect the degree to which there ispeace in Europe. In this respect, it was exceedingly important that EasternEuropeans speak to their fellow Eastern Europeans, not only to WesternEuropeans

June 17 & 18, 1991. Bucharest, Romania


Rogers Brubaker,  Harvard University

Istvan Deak,  Columbia University

Donald Horowitz,  Duke University School of Law

Kenneth Jowitt,  University of California, Berkeley

Allen H. Kassof,  IREX

Gail Klifipnan,  University of California, Berkeley

Livia B. Plaks,  IREX

Katherine Verdery,  Johns Hopkins University

Larry Watts,  Rapporteur, IREX Bucharest Office


Ivan Ilchev  (Bulgaria), Sofia University

Aleksandra Jasinska  (Poland), Warsaw University

Helena Klimova  (Czechoslovakia), Psychotherapist - Prague

Attila Pok  (Hungary), Hungarian Academy of Sciences

Vodislav Stanovcic  (Yugoslavia), Belgrade University


Mihai Draganescu,  President of the Romanian Academy

Nicolae Cajal,  Vice-President of the Romanian Academy

Radu Grigorovici,  Vice-President of the Romanian Academy

Ion Coteanu

Cornelia Bodea

Dinu Giurescu,  University of Bucharest

Camil Muresan,  University of Cluj-Napoca

Dan Berindei

Vladimir Trebici

Cornel Popa,  University of Bucharest

Carmen Seuleanu

Dragos Seuleanu


Gelcu Maxutovici,  National Museum of History

Sergiu Belian,  Editor of "Nor Ghiank"

Luca Farncisc Veliciov,  Professor

Moses Rosen,  Chief Rabbi of Romania

Lia Ciplea,  Helsinki Committee

Haim Riemer,  Editor in Chief of Cultural Mosaic Review

Kirile Feodor,  University of Bucharest

Geza Domokos,  President of the Kriterion Foundation

Zoltan Rostas,  Editor of "A Het"

Paul Philippi,  Institute of Theology

Hans Fink,  Editor of "Neuer Weg"

Janina Radu,  Editor in Chief of "POLONUS"

Vasile Burtea,  Ministry of Labor and Social Aid

Nicolae Gheorghe,  Institute of Sociology of the Romanian Academy

Mile Tomici,  Institute of Linguistics

Mehmet Ali Ekrem,  University of Bucharest

Ivan Covaci,  Editor in Chief of "Vilne Slovo"

Andrej Stefanco

Gheorghi Vitanidis


Gabriel Gafita,  Department of Socio-Political Studies of Reform for theRomanian Government

Ovidiu Sincai,  Department of Socio-Political Studies of Reform for theRomanian Government

Alexandru Radu,  Department of Socio-Political Studies of Reform for theRomanian's Meltdown

Gheorghe Duculescu,  Romanian Senate

Marius Guran,  Counselor to the President of Romania

Iosif Bota,  Counselor to the President of Romania